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Summary findings
Recent literature  has emphasized  the importance  of  They find that the efficiency of ports is also  important.
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access to markets,  and increases  in  per capita income.  75th percentile reduces  shipping costs by 12  percent.
For most Latin American  countries transport costs are a  (On average,  having bad ports is equivalent  to being 60
greater barrier to U.S.  markets than import tariffs.  percent farther away  from markets.)  Inefficient  ports also
Clark, Dollar, and Micco investigate  the determinants  increase handling costs, which  are part of shipping costs.
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database  (more than 300,000 observations  a year)  on  efficiency.  They find that the variations  are linked to
shipments  of products at the six-digit level  of the  excessive  regulation, the prevalence  of organized crime,
Harmonized  System of classification  from different ports  and the general  condition  of the country's  infrastructure.
around the world.  They find that distance and
containerization  matter.
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Since  the  beginning  of  modem  economics  the  literature  concerning  the
determination  of living  standards  has been  interested  in  trade.]  Despite  some  lingering
controversy,  empirical  studies  show  a positive  relationship  between  trade  and  growth.
Frankel and Romer (1999)  claim that "...trade has a quantitatively  large, significant,  and
robust positive effect on income."2
The lack of initial consensus among researchers  on the relationship between trade
and  growth has been mirrored by differences  in the  actual trade  strategies  of developing
countries.  During  the  1960s  and  into  the  1970s,  many  countries  adopted  import
substitution  policies  to  protect  their  infant  industries,  though  a  few  economies  in  East
Asia took a different approach.  By the  1990s many developing  countries,  including most
of the  large ones, had shifted to  an outward-oriented  strategy and had  seen accelerations
in their growth rates.3
These  recent  liberalizations  have  reduced  tariff and,  in  some  cases,  non-tariff
barriers too. For instance, Asia reduced its average  tariff rate from  30% at the beginning
of the  1980s to 14% by the end of the 1990s, and Latin America reduced its average tariff
rate  from 31% to 11%.4  These reductions  in artificial trade barriers  have implied that the
relative  importance of transport costs  as a determinant  of trade has increased.5 As shown
in Figure 1, in 1997  total import freight costs represented  5.25  percent of world imports.
This percentage  -which  may seem low- is mainly driven by developed  countries,  which
represent  more  than 70  percent  of world  imports  and whose  proximity to  each  other is
reflected  in  a  relatively  low  freight  cost  (4.2%).  When  disaggregating  these  costs  by
region, they turn out to be substantially higher.  Although  Latin America  appears to have
low freight costs relative  to the other  developing  regions (7% compared to  8%  for Asia
Adams  Smith  (The  Wealth  of Nations,  1776),  in  his  discussion  of specialization  and  the  extent of the
market stresses the relationship  between wealth and trade between nations.
2 Similarly,  Ades and  Glaeser  (1999)  find that openness  accelerates  growth of backward economies.  For a
skeptical view of the cross-national evidence,  see Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999).
3 See Dollar and Kraay (2001).
4 Central America  and the Caribbean reduced its average tariff rate from 21% to 9% between these periods,
and African  countries  from  30% to 20%.  These  average  tariff rates correspond  to  simple averages  across
countries of their unweighted tariff. If we consider weighted  tariffs, the resulting  average tariff rates by the
end of the  90s should be smaller. (Source:  World Bank)
1and  11.5% for Africa),  the Latin American figure is weighted by Mexico's proximity to
its  main  trading partner,  the  United  States,  and  consequently  low  freight  costs.  When
Mexico  is  excluded,  Latin  American  average  freight  costs  rise  to  8.3  percent,  more
similar to the rest of the developing countries.
As  liberalization  continues  to  reduce  artificial  barriers,  the  effective  rate  of
protection provided by transport costs is now in many cases higher than the one provided
by tariffs.  Figure 2 presents  a comparison  of average  tariffs and a measure of transport
costs  for  various  countries  around  the  world,  and  Figure  3  presents  an  alternative
comparison  of transport  costs to the US  and average tariffs faced  in the US market  by a
group of Latin American countries.  From Figure  3, it is striking to realize  that for some
countries,  such  as  Chile and Ecuador, transport costs  exceed by more than twenty times
the  average  tariffs  they  face  in  the  US  market.  Consequently,  any  additional  effort  to
integrate  a  country  into  the  trading  system  should  consider  and  analyze  the effect  of
transport costs and its determinants.
As a result,  some  immediate questions  arise. How much  do these transport costs
affect  trade  and  growth?  How  much  of these  costs  can  be  affected  by  government
policies?  The  broad  literature  that  applies  the  gravity  approach  to  the  study  of
international  bilateral  trade shows that geographical  distance, which is used as proxy for
transport  costs,  is  negatively  related  to  trade.6 In  a recent paper,  Limao  and Venables
(2000,  henceforth  LV)  show  that  raising  transport  costs  by  10  percent  reduces  trade
volumes by more than  20 percent.  They  also  show that poor infrastructure  accounts  for
more  than 40%  of predicted  transport  costs.  In  a  different  analysis,  Radelet  and  Sachs
(1998)  show that shipping costs reduce the  rate of growth of both manufactured  exports
and GDP per capita. These authors claim that "...  doubling the shipping cost (e.g. from an
8%  to 16%  CIF band)  is associated with slower annual growth of slightly more than-half
of one percentage point."
In  spite  of the relevance  of transport  costs  for  trade  and growth,  there  are  not
many other  studies on transport  costs.  Moreover,  these  few  studies  rely on macro  level
data,  which  is certainly  useful  but misses  the  advantages  that  microdata  can  have.  An
5 See Amjadi and Yeats (1995)  and Radelet and Sachs (1998).
6An example of this literature  is Bergstrand (1985).
2exception  is a recent  study of Fink,  Mattoo  and  Neagu (2000,  henceforth FMN), which
analyzes  the  determinants  of maritime  transport costs  in  1998,  focusing on the  effect of
non-competitive public  and private policies. They find the latter have a significant effect
on transport  costs.  But, what about other factors influencing  transport costs,  such as port
efficiency?  There is a wide consensus  on the crucial importance  of port  activities  for the
transport services.  However, there are no measures of how important are inefficiencies  at
port level  for transport  costs.  This is one of the objectives  of this  study.  We analyze the
effect  of port efficiency  on transport  costs (in addition  to other standard variables),  and
then we explore the factors that lie behind port efficiency.
Our analysis departs  from FMN (2000)  by incorporating port efficiency variables
and by redefining  some  variables.  In addition,  we  address  the problems  of endogeneity
and omitted variable bias that their estimations present,  and we also  extend backward the
period of analysis to 1995.  We find that a  100 percent increase in distance raises maritime
transport  costs  by  around  20  percent,  a  result  that  is quite  consistent  with the existent
literature.  With respect to port efficiency,  we find that improving port efficiency from the
25th to  7 5 th percentiles reduces  shipping costs by more than  12%. This result is robust to
different definitions of port efficiency  as well as to different  years.
In turn, when looking at the determinants of port efficiency, we find that the level
of infrastructure  and organized crime  exert a significant  positive  and negative  influence
respectively.  In  addition,  policy  variables  reflecting  regulations  at  seaports  affect  port
efficiency in a non-linear  way. This result  suggests that having  some level of regulation
increases port efficiency,  but an excess of regulation could start to reverse these gains.
The  remainder  of this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  II  presents  a
description  of factors  that  may  be  behind  transport  costs.  Section  III  describes  the
econometric  model  used  to  quantify  the  relative  importance  of these  factors  affecting
transport costs.  It also contains  a description of the data used as well  as the results of our
analyses.  In  Section  IV,  we  analyze  how  important  are  infrastructure,  regulation  and
organized crime in explaining port efficiency.  Section V concludes.
3II.  What Factors Explain Maritime Transport Costs?
As  shown, transport costs may be an important barrier to trade  and could have an
important  effect on income.  But why do some countries  have higher transport  costs than
others?  What  are  the  main  determinants  of these  transport  costs?  Can  government
policies affect these costs? Following some previous studies,7 this section addresses these
questions,  based  on  a  qualitative  and  quantitative  description  of  transport  cost
determinants.  Given  its relative  importance  (and  also  the  availability  of data),  the main
focus in this paper is on international maritime transport cost.
The  nature  of  services  provided  by  shipping  companies  forces  them  to  be
transnational companies serving more than one country.  In general, these companies have
access to international  capital markets and they are able to hire workers  from all over the
world8,  although under some restrictions  sometimes.  In any  case,  we should  not expect
differences  in capital  or labor  costs  to be the main  factors  in explaining  differences  of
transport costs across countries. There are many other important specific  factors  affecting
transport costs across countries, which we present next.
The  obvious  and  most  studied  determinant  of  transport  cost  is  geography,
particularly  distance.9 The  greater  the  distance  between  two  markets,  the  higher  the
expected  transport  cost  for  their trade.  Using shipping  company  quotes  for  the  cost of
transporting  a  standard  container  from  Baltimore  (USA)  to  selected  worldwide
destinations,  LV(2000)  find that an extra 1,000 km raises transport costs by $380 (or 8%
for  a  median  shipment).  Moreover,  breaking  the journey  into  an  overland  and  a  sea
component,  an extra 1,000  km by sea raises  costs by only $190 while the same distance
by land raises  costs by $1,380-4  and 30 percent of a median shipment,  respectively.  In
addition,  if a country  is landlocked,  transport costs rise by $2,170,  almost  a 50 percent
7  This  section  follows  McConville  (1999)  Fuchsluger  (1999),  Limao  and  Venables  (2000),  and  Fink,
Mattoo and Neagu (2000).
8  Shipping  companies  prefer  to  sail  their  ships  under  open-registry  flags.  This  explains  that  Panama,
Liberia,  Cyprus and Bahamas  account  for more than 40  percents of world fleet  (measured in dead weight
tons -dwt-)  -UNCTAD  (1998)-.
9 It has long been recognized  that bilateral  trade patterns  are well  described empirically  by the so-called
gravity  equation,  which  relates  bilateral  trade  positively  to  both  countries  GDP  and  negatively  to  the
distance (which is used as proxy for transport cost) between them. See Bergstrand (1985).
4increase  in the  average  cost.10 In  other words,  being  landlocked  is equivalent  to  being
located  10,000 km farther away from markets.
Trade composition additionally helps to explain transport  costs differences  across
countries.  First of all, due to the insurance  component  of transport  costs, products  with
higher unit value have higher charges per unit of weight.  On average,  insurance  fees are
around  2  percent  of the  traded  value  and  they  represent  around  15  percent  of total
maritime  charges.  Therefore,  high value  added  exporting  countries  should  have  higher
charges  per  unit  weight  due  to  this  insurance  component.  On  the  other  hand,  some
products require special transport  features and therefore have different freight rates. l  l
Directional  imbalance in trade  between  countries  implies  that many carriers  are
forced to haul empty containers  back. As a result, either imports or exports become more
expensive.  Fuchsluger  (2000)  shows that  this  phenomenon  is observed  in  the  bilateral
trade between the US and the  Caribbean.  In 1998,  for instance,  72 percent of containers
sent from the Caribbean to the US were empty.  This excess of supply in the northbound
route  implied that a US exporter paid  83  percent  more than a US importer for the  same
type of merchandise  between Miami and Port of Spain (Trinidad  and Tobago).'2 Similar
phenomena  occur in the Asian-US and the Asian-European  trade routes,  where excess of
supply  means  that  Asian  exporters  end  up  paying  more  than  50%  of extra  charge  in
transport costs compared to suppliers in the US and Europe.13
Maritime  transport  is  a  classic  example  of example  of an  industry  that  faces
increasing return  to scale.  Alfred Marshall  put it clearly  long ago:  "...  a ship's carrying
power  varies  as  the  cube  of her  dimensions,  while  the resistance  offered  by the water
increases  only  a  little  faster  than  the  square  of her  dimensions". 14  Besides  increasing
10 This  result controls  by  the  extra  overland  distance  that must be  overcome  by landlocked  countries  to
reach the sea.
'l  LSU-National  Ports and Waterways Institute (1998) shows that the average freight rates between Central
America  and Miami for cooled load merchandise  is about twice the transport cost for textiles.
12 The actual  freight rates  for a 20-feet dry container  between  Miami  and Port of Spain  were  $1,400 and
$750 for the southbound and northbound route, respectively.
13  Ships going from Asia to the US utilize more than 75 percent of their capacity,  while when going back to
Asia the utilization does not even attain a 50 percent rate. The rates from Asia to the US and in the opposite
direction are  $1561/TEU (twenty-feet equivalent  unit) and $9991TEU respectively.  The capacity utilization
of ships from Asia to Europe is 75% and 58% in the opposite direction,  while the rates charged by shipping
companies are $1353/TEU and $873/TEU respectively.
14  Quoted  by  McConville  (1999).  Additional  economies  of scale  come  from both material  to  build  the
vessel and labor to operate it (especially that of navigation).
5returns at the vessel level,  there are economies  of scale at the seaport level.  For instance,
at the  port of Buenos  Aires  (Argentina)  the  cost of using  the  access  channel  is $70 per
container for a 200 TEU1 5 vessel but only $14 per container for a 1000 TEU vessel.' 6 In
general,  even though most of these economies of scale are at the vessel level, in practice
they are related  to the total volume  of trade between  two regions.  Maritime  routes  with
low trade volumes are covered by small vessels and vice versa. 17
In  addition,  the  development  of containerized  transport  has  been  an  important
technological  change  in  the  transport  sector  during  the  last  decades.  Containers  have
allowed  large  cost  reductions  in  cargo  handling,  increasing  cargo  transshipment  and
therefore  national  and  international  cabotage.' 8 In  turn,  this  increase  in  cabotage  has
induced the  creation of hub ports that  allow  countries  or  regions  to  take  advantage  of
increasing return to scale.19
Commercial  routes  more  liable  to  competition  and  less  subject  to  monopoly
power  will  tend  to have  lower markups.  Monopoly  powers  can  be  sustained  either by
government  restrictive  trade  policies  or by private  anti-competitive  practices  (cartels).
The  former includes  a variety of cargo  reservation  schemes,  for example  the UN Liner
Code.20 Private  anti-competitive  practices  include,  among  others,  the  practice  of fixing
rates  of maritime  conferences.2'  Some  authors have  claimed  that  maritime conferences
have  lost power  in  recent years,22 which  has  forced  shipping  companies  to  merge  as  a
way to hold their monopoly power.23
15 TEU is a standard container measure and it refers to Twenty Feet Equivalent Unit.
16 See Fuchsluger (2000).
" See PIERS,  On Board  Review, Spring 1997.
18  Cabotage refers to transshipment of the merchandise  before it arrives to its final destination.
19  See Hoffian (2000).
20  This agreement  stipulates that conference  trade between two economies  can allocate  cargo according  to
the  40:40:20 principle.  Forty per cent of tonnage  is reserved  for the national  flag  lines of each exporting
and  importing  economy  and  the  remaining  20  per  cent  is to  be  allocated  to  liner  ships  from  a  third
economy.
21 Maritime conferences  enjoy an exemption  from competition rules in major trading countries, like the US
and the European Union.
22  In  the last years  there have  been  some  reforms  in the  regulation  affecting  international  shipping.  For
instance,  the United States' Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 eroded the power of conferences,  creating
greater scope for price competition.
3  See Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000) and Hoffman (2000).
6Similar restrictions and anti-competitive practices  can induce inefficiencies  and/or
monopoly power in ports.  For example,  in many countries  workers  are required  to have
special license to be able to provide stevedoring  services,  and in general these restrictions
imply high fees and low productivity.24
Finally,  the  quality  of  onshore  infrastructure  is  an  important  determinant  of
transport  costs. LV(2000)  find that it accounts  for 40 percent of predicted  transport costs
for coastal countries,  and up to 60%  for landlocked  ones.25 If a country with a relatively
poor  infrastructure,  say  at  the  7 5th  percentile  in  an  international  ranking,  is  able  to
upgrade to the 25th percenitile,  it will be able to reduce  transport costs by between 30 and
50 percent.26
III.  Maritime Transport Costs Estimation
Focusing  on the  factors  affecting  transport  costs  already  described,  this  section
attempts to quantify the importance of most27 of them on maritime transport  charges  paid
by  U.S.  imports  carried  by  liner  companies28 from  countnres  all  over  the  world.  This
analysis  closely follows FMN  (2000). However,  we add additional  variables - notably a
measure  of port  efficiency  - to  the  analysis,  we  redefine  some  of the  other  relevant
vanables  (including  the dependent  vanrable),  and we also  extend backward  the period of
analysis  to  1995.  In  addition,  we  address  the  problems  of endogeneity  and  omitted
24  In 1981  the supply of seaport service  were de-regulated  in Chile,  and the change  in legislation  induced a
significant  fall in seaport cost. See Trujillo and Nombela (1999)  and Camara Chilena Maritima  (1999) for a
discussion of this case.
25  Their infrastructure  index  is  measured  as a simple  weighted average  of kilometers  of road, paved road,
rail  and  telephone  main  line  (per  square  Km  of country  area  and  population,  respectively).  In  their
regression, the authors us-  this  index to the power of -.3.
26  LV(2000)  use  two  alternative  measures  of transport  costs:  CIF/FOB  ratios  reported  for  bilateral  trade
between countries bx  the IMF  and quotes  from a shipping  company.  According to them, an improvement  in
own infrastructure  from  the 75th to the  25dl percentiles  reduces  transport  costs by 30% based  on shipping
data  (from $6,604  to $4,638)  and  by more  than 50% based  on the CIF/FOB  ratio  (from 1.40  to  1.11).  In
addition,  an  improvement  in own and transit countries'  infrastructures  from the 75b to the 25'  percentiles
reduces by more than half the disadvantage  associated with being landlocked.
27  We do not analyze the impact of trade imbalance  in transport  charges because of data unavailability.
28  For most countries,  US imports account for a significant  share of their exports.  For instance, US imports
accounted  for  56 percent of Latin American exports  in  1999, and they  accounted  for 31  percent  of Japan's
exports this year.
7variable  bias we believe  their estimations present,  which we explain  in the rest of this
section.
The Model
To  estimate  the  importance  of each  factor  in maritime  transport  costs we use  a
standard  reduced  form  approach.  Maritime  charges  are  assumed  to  be  equal  to  the
marginal  cost multiplied  by shipping  companies'  markup.  Expressed  in  logarithm,  we
have:
Aik= mc(i,j,k)  +  (I,  J, k)  [1]
Where:
pijk:  charges  per  unit  of weight,  in  logarithm,  for  the  product  k  transported  between
locations i andj.
i: corresponds to foreign port, located in country I
j: corresponds to US port, located in district J
k: product,  aggregated at the 6 digit of the Harnonized System (HS) Classification
mc: marginal cost, in logarithm.
p: markup, in logarithm.
As expressed in equation  [1], both the marginal cost and the markup  should be a
function of factors depending on the port or country of origin (i,), the port or district of
destiny  in  the  US  (],J) and  the  type  of product  (k).  In  particular,  we  assume  that the
marginal cost has the following form:
MCjk = aJ + Xk  + y  wvijk + y Tjk + d  diJ +  qlJ + co PE,  [2]
Where:
aj: dummy variable referring to US district J.
Ak:  dummy variable referring to product k.
8WVijk:  value per weight  for product  k,  transported  from  foreign port  i  to  US port j,  in
logarithm.  We also refer to this variable as the weight value.
Tijk: fraction of k goods shipped (from i to j) in containers.
dij: distance between foreign port i and US custom district J, in logarithm.
qfj: volume  of imports  carried by liner companies  between  country  I  and US coasts,  in
logarithm.
PEI: ports' efficiency of foreign country I.
The  first term (aj) in equation [2]  takes into account potential  differences  in port
efficiencies  across  US  custom  districts.  The  second  term  (Ak)  accounts  for  different
marginal costs across products. The third term - weight value, (wvijk)  - is used as a proxy
for  the  insurance  component  of the maritime  transport  cost (pik).  The fourth  term (Tijk)
represent  a  technological  effect,  and  it  captures  reductions  in  costs  induced  by  the
utilization of containers.  The fifth term (du) refers to the maritime distance between trade
partners.  The  next variable  (qlj)  accounts  for  potential  economies  of scale,  and the  last
term (PEI) accounts  for port efficiency in the foreign  country. Thus, we expect a positive
sign for  V/  and  9,  and a negative sign for r, z7,  and co.
At this stage, we highlight three differences with respect to FMN (2000). The first
two  refer  to  the  construction  of the  dependent  variable  and  the  variable  measuring
economies of scale.  For the first, we use charges per weight (instead of charges per unit,
as  they  do),  because  - despite  the level  of disaggregation  of the  data  - there  are  still
important  differences  inside  product  categories.  This  heterogeneity  inside  product
categories  is better captured when using our definition.  With respect to the  economy of
scale  variable,  we define  it as  the volume of imports  departing  from  a particular  foreign
country  and  arriving  to  a  particular  coast  in  the  US.29 A  third  and  more  important
difference  lies  in  the  inclusion  of the  weight-to-value  variable.  As  already  stated,  this
variable accounts  for the  effect of the  insurance component  on the transport cost and, as
we show next, it turns out to be highly significant.  FMN (2000) do not include  a variable
of this  type,  probably  because  of the  inclusion  of dummies  per  product.  However,
29 FMN (2000)  define this variable as the total value of imports  departing from a particular foreign port and
arriving  to a particular US  district.
9because of the insufficient  level of disaggregation  of the  data, product dummies  are not
enough and the exclusion of this variable can cause important omitted variable bias.30
Finally,  and here  we follow  more  closely FMN  (2000)  formulation,  we assume
that shipping companies'  markups have the following form:
,u(I, J, k)  Pk +  V/  A  PA  +  'CA A  CA  [3]
Where
AIJPA: existence of price-fixing agreements between country I and US district J.
AliCA: existence of cooperative working agreement between country I and US district J.
The  first  term  (pk)  in  the  above  equation  reflects  a  product-specific  effect  that
captures differences in transport demand elasticity across goods (this is a derived demand
from the  final  demand  of good  k  in  the US).  The  last  two terms  account  for potential
collusive  agreements between  shipping companies  covering  a  same route.  Two  types of
agreements  are  distinguished:  price-fixing  agreements  (which  include  most  maritime
conferences),  and cooperative  working  agreements  that  do not  have binding rate setting
authority.  Substituting  the  second  and  third equations  into  the  first  one,  we  obtain  the
econometric  model to be estimated:
Pyk = a  + Ak +  If wvyk +  y Tik +  du  +  i7qj +  co PE, +  /AAIA  +  YCAIJCA  +
[4]
Where:
fik=  Lk  +Pk
LJk:  error term.
30 We replicated  FMN  (2000)  estimations  with  and  without the  unit value variable  (which  is  the relevant
variable  to  add  in  their  specification,  given  their  construction  of the  dependent  variable).  The  variable
turned out to be highly significant  (even  after using product  dummies),  but their results  for the rest of the
variables changed dramatically.
10Data3' and Results
Data  on  maritime  transport  costs,  value  and  volume  of imports,  and  shipping
characteristics  - like the percentage of the goods transported through  containers - come
from  the  U.S.  hnport  Waterborne  Databank  (U.S.  Department  of Transportation).  Our
dependent  vanrable  -- transport  costs - is  constructed  using  imnports charges, defined  by
the U.S.  Census  Bureau  as:  "...the  aggregate  cost  of all  freight,  insurance,  and  other
charges  (excluding  U.S.  import  duties)  incurred  in  bringing  the  merchandise  from
alongside the carrier at the port of exportation  -in the country of exportation-  and placing
it alongside the carrier at the first port of entry in the United States."
The U.S. Import Waterborne Databank covers the period  1995-1999.  Even though
this database  includes  all U.S.  imports carried  by sea,  classified  by type of vessel service
(liner, tanker and tramp), we focus only on liner services  to be able to estimate the effect
of conferences  and agreements  in manrtime  charges.32 Liner imports account  for around
50 percent  of total US imports  and 65  percent of US maritime  imports.33  Given  that our
objective  is to focus only on maritime transport  costs, we also  drop  all  the observations
for which the origin of the import is different  from  the port of shipment.34
The  distance  variable  and  the  data  on  maritime  conferences  and  working
agreement  between liners  were kindly provided  by FMN(2000).  The  first correspond  to
the distance  between  foreign  ports  and  US  custom  districts;  it is expressed  in  nautical
miles, and comes in turn from a private service.  The data on carrier agreements  - used by
FMN to construct their indices-  comes  from the Federal Maritime  Commission,  it covers
59  countries  and  is  available  only  for  1998.  Therefore,  when  estimating  for  the  other
years (1995-97,  1999), we have no choice but to use the same  1998  values for all them.
Unfortunately,  there is not much comparable  information about port efficiency -at
port level-  to be used  in  a cross-country  analysis.35 So, we use  an aggregated  measure  -
31  Appendix A gives a complete  description of the data used.
32  This also  allow  us to compare  our results with  FMiN  (2000)  ones.  Liner  services  are scheduled  carriers
that advertise in publications advance of sailing. They generally have a fix itinerary and tend to carry mixed
types of containerized,  non-bulk  cargo.  Tramp  and tanker  services,  in turn,  are  (dry,  liquid)  bulk carriers
and have no regular scheduled itineraries, but are more depending  on momentary demand.
33  The remaining  US imports by sea are  carried by tramp services.
34 That is,  in transit merchandise  is not included.
35  The World Bank is launching a program (Global  Facilitation  Partnership  for Transportation  and Trade)
to focus on significant  improvements in the invisible infrastructure  of transport and trade in different
11per country- of port efficiency, consisting  of a one-to-seven  index (with 7  being the best
score) from the Global Competitiveness  Report (GCR).  This annual  data is available  for
the  period  1995-1999.36  As  an  alternative  measure,  we  also  use  GDP  per capita  as  a
proxy  for port efficiency.  Countries'  GDP  per  capita  are  correlated  with  their level  of
infrastructure.  For  our  particular  problem  - explaining  the  cost  of shipping  the  same
product from different ports in the world to the U.S.  - it is hard to see why the per capita
GDP of the sending country would matter except to the  extent that it is proxying for the
quality  of infrastructure.  As  noted,  we will use both this  indirect  measure  and  a direct
measure of port efficiency in different specifications.
In addition to the per capita GDP, we construct  a second measure of infrastructure
- this time  an index  a la LV  (2000)  - based  on information  at  country  level  on paved
road,  paved  airports,  railways and telephone  lines.37 We  incorporate  this variable  based
on the assumption that the infrastructure  level in a country is likely highly correlated with
the infrastructure  level at their ports, and also because it allows us to compare our results
with LV  (2000).  We  should note that,  despite  having a  somewhat  similar infrastructure
index, our formulation differs  from that of LV (2000) in many respects. First, one of their
measures of transport costs is the CIF/FOB ratio, which has the disadvantage of being an
aggregate measure  for all products,  while we  use transport  cost information  at product
level. Also,  this measure  is well  known for having measurement  deficiencies  (although
they try to control for that). Their second measure of transport costs - shipping rates (for
a  homogeneous  product)  from  Baltimore  to  a  group  of different  countries  - tries  to
address these problems. However,  as the same authors point out, the shipping rates from
Baltimore  are not necessarily representative  -not even  for the rest of the US  ports.  Our
database,  on  the  other  hand,  has  information  from  many  ports  around  the  world  to
different  ports  in the  US.38 An  advantage  of their  second  measure,  however,  is that  it
member countries. However,  the project is in its first stage and it does not cover all the countries  of our
sample yet.
36  The report,  in turn,  is based on micro-data  from annual  surveys at  firm level,  made  to a representative
group  of enterprises  in  every country.  The  particular  question  for port efficiency  is:  "Port  facilities and
inland waterways are extensive and efficient. (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)". The number of
countries covered has been growing over time (from 44 in the  1996 report to 56 in the 2000 one).
37 See the Appendix for a description of its construction.
38 In addition, we believe their second sample is biased in favor of African countries.  The bad infrastructure
and port quality of African countries may be biasing upward the coefficient estimates they obtain.
12allows them to construct an estimate of inland transport cost, which is not our purpose  in
this paper.
Table  1 reports our estimations for equation [4]. We start by presenting the results
only  for  1998  because  the variables  on  maritime  conferences  and  working  agreement
between liners refer to this particular year.  The first three columns  show the coefficients
using  OLS,  while  the  rest  of  the  estimations  use  an  Instrumental  Variable  (IV)
technique.39 Columns  (1)  and (4) report the results using  GDP per capita  as a proxy for
port efficiency,  columns  (2)  and (5)  use  the variable  port efficiency  from the GCR,  and
columns  (3)  and  (6)  use the index of infrastructure  we constructed.  As it can be seen,  in
both type of estimations most of the variables are highly significant and with the expected
sign.
Distance has a significant (at  1%) positive effect on transport costs. A doubling in
distance,  for  instance,  roughly  generates  a  20  percent  increase  in transport  costs.  This
distance elasticity close to 0.2 is consistent with the existent  literature on transport  costs.
The  value per  weight  variable  is  also  positive  and highly  significant,  with  a  t-statistic
around 50.  As already  stated, these regressions  include dummy variables  for products  at
the  six-digit  HS  level.  One  might  think that  unit  values would  be  quite  similar across
countries  at  that level  of disaggregation;  not  so.  Feenstra  (1996)  shows  that there  is  a
large  variation  in  unit  values  even  at  the  10-digit  HS  level.  He  cites  the  examples  of
men's  cotton shirts,  which  the  U.S.  imports  from  fully half of its  162  trading partners.
The unit values range  from $56 (Japan) to $1  (Senegal).  These differences  in unit values
lead  to  large  differences  in  insurance  costs  per  kilogram,  even  for  "homogeneous"
products.  So, it is not surprising that we find that the more expensive the product, per unit
of weight,  the higher the insurance and hence the overall transport  cost.40
39 In all the estimations  (OLS,  IV), we allow the observations to be independent  across exporting  countries,
but  not necessarily  independent  within  countries.  At the  same  time,  the  standard errors  presented in the
table correspond  to the consistent Huber/White  ones.
40 In  addition,  there  is the  possibility that the  unit weight variable  could be capturing  some  measurement
errors. The  argument is  as follows.  One  should  expect  that the variables  charges and  (total) import value
were very carefully measured, because  the US custom constructs the dutiable value of  imports by excluding
the former to the  latter (and  it should have a  special interest in calculating  it correctly).  However, this could
not be case  for the measurement of weight. If so, measurement  errors in the weight variable  would induce a
positive correlation between charges  per weight (our dependent variable)  and value per weight.
13With  respect  to  the  two  variables  referring  to  agreements  between  liner
companies,  only  the  first  of them  (price  fixing  binding  agreements)  turns  out  to  be
positive  -as  expected-  but only significant  (at  10%)  in two  specifications.4  This  result
seems  to  suggest  that  maritime  conferences  have  been  exerting  some  mild  monopoly
power - adding an estimated 6% to transport costs in  1998, ceteris paribus. However,  as
we  will  see  later,  this  estimated  effect  of the  price-fixing  agreements  is  not  always
significant for other years.
The next  variable,  the level  of containerization,  presents  a  significant  negative
effect  on  transport  costs.  As  explained  before,  this  variable  represents  technological
change  at  both  vessels  and  seaport  level.  The  idea  behind  this  result  is  that
containerization  reduces  services  cost,  such  as  cargo  handling,  and  therefore  total
maritime charges.
The variable  capturing economies of scale is the level of trade that goes through a
42 particular maritime route.  This variable,  calculated in terms of volume, has a significant
negative  coefficient  (as expected).43 However,  the direct incorporation of this variable in
the estimations  presents  a problem of endogeneity.  On one hand,  one should  expect the
more  the trade the lower  the transport  costs. But,  at the same time, lower transport costs
induce more trade.  We address this problem in columns  (4) to (6).
Finally, the coefficient related to port efficiency is negative and significant  (at 1%
in all  cases):  the  greater  the efficiency at  port level,  the  lower the transport  costs.  This
result  is robust  to the three alternative  measures  of port  efficiency (columns  1 to 3).  In
particular,  the  coefficient  for  the  measure  from  the  Global  Competitiveness  Report
(column  2),  along  with  the  distribution  of the  port efficiency  index  among  countries,
indicates  that  an  improvement  in  port  efficiency  from  the  25th  to the  7 5th  percentile
4' FMN  (2000)  find  the  price-fixing  agreement  dummy  variable  to  be  significant  and  much  larger  in
magnitude:  between  .4 and .51; that is,  the maritime  agreements  add at least 40% to transport  costs.  They
also  use policy variables  referring  to  cargo reservation  policies  (not  significant),  cargo handling  services
(significant  in  one  estimation  but with  wrong  sign,  and  not significant  in another),  and mandatory  port
services (significant,  correct sign).
42  Each couple  foreign  country and US coast  is defined  as a maritime route. We define  three  coasts  in the
US: East, West and Golf coast.
43 We  must note that this variable  differs  from the one presented by Fink,  Mattoo and Neagu (2000) in two
aspects.  First,  they use  the  value  of imports  while  we  use the  volume  of imports  (in  tons).  Second,  the
definitions  of maritime route through  which economies  of scale arise  are  different:  they use  the trade (in
14reduces  transport  charges  a  little  more  than  12%.44  In  tenns  of particular  countries,  if
China,  Indonesia  and/or  Mexico  -for  instance-  improved  their  port  efficiency  to  levels
observed  in  countries  like  France  and/or  Sweden,  their  reductions  in  transport  costs
45 would be around  12%. Similar results are obtained for the other measures.
To  solve  the  endogeneity  problem  mentioned  above,  we use  countnres'  GDP  as
instrument.  We  make  the  identifying  assumption  that  if country  size  affects  transport
costs,  it  does  so  through  the  volume  of trade  and  economies  of  scale  in  shipping.
Columns  (4)  to  (6)  in  Table  1 present  the  results  for  the  instrumental  variable  (TV)
estimations.  Most coefficients  remain  stable  -with the  expected  signs-  and they continue
to be significant. Using the instrumental  variables, the economy of scale vanrable remains
negative  and significant,  but the magnitude of the coefficient  increases  in absolute value
when we use the GCR measure of port efficiency (-0.04 v/s -0.02). Thus, we estimate that
doubling  the  volume  of trade  between  a  particular  port  and the  U.S.  reduces  transport
costs by 3-4%.  As we already mentioned,  the coefficients  for the rest of the variables  -in
particular, for the three port efficiency measures-  are quite stable.
We perforned similar estimations for the rest of the years for which we have data.
For  brevity  of  space,  Table  2  presents  the  estimated  coefficients  only  for  the  IV
regressions using the GCR variable for port efficiency.46
For each  year,  the  coefficients  on  distance  and  weight-to-value  are  quite  stable
and  significant  (at  1%).47  Prior  to  1999,  the  first  year  after the US  eroded the power  of
Conferences,  the  pnrce-fixing  rate  agreement  has  the  expected  sign  but  it  is  only
significant  (at  10%) in  1997.  In 1999, the coefficient  turns negative,  a result that may be
value)  between  foreign  ports  and  US  districts  (31),  while  we use  the  trade  (in volume)  between  foreign
countries and US coasts (3).
44 Thiat is,  when port efficit iacy  is  measured  with the GCR  index,  an improvement  in port  efficiency  from
25th to  75th  percentile  (i.e.  from a  score  of 3.4  to  5.6 respectively)  generates  a  maritime  transport  costs
decline of around  12%.
45 When proxying  poll  efficiency  with the per  capita GDP,  an increase  from the 25h to the 75th  percentile
reduces maritime  -i.  .rt  charges  in 14%. When  using the infrastructure  index, the reduction  in transport
costs is around 8%.  This last variable could be showing  a  smaller effect because  in fact it  is measuring  the
existence  of infrastructure,  but  not necessarily  its  quality,  while  the  other measures  should  capture  also
quality.
46 We use the port efficiency index from the  1999 GCR for all years,  in order to avoid a drastic  decrease  in
the number of countries covered by the report.
41  The exception  is the  coefficient  for  distance  in 1999.  which  increases  to 0.25.  One  reason why distance
may be having  a bigger  effect this year could be the increase  in oil prices  (from an average  of $13/barrel in
1998  to $18/barrel  in  1999).
15related to a war in prices between  shipping companies that were previously members of
conferences.  Cooperative agreement  is significant only in 1995 but with the wrong sign.
In addition, when we use the infrastructure  index  that we created  (not shown here) none
of these  policy  variables  is  significant.  From  these  results  it  is  difficult  to  conclude
whether conferences have been exerting some monopoly power or not.
From  Table  2  we  can  see  that the  coefficient  on  containerization  is  significant
only  in  1998.48  In  the  case  of  Total  Liner  Volumes,  the  coefficient  is  in  general
significant  and quite stable over time. Finally, the estimated coefficient  for port efficiency
is stable  and significant  from both  an economic  and statistical  point of view.  When we
used the infrastructure  index from the GCR (not shown here) we obtain similar results in
terms of stability and significance.  These results  allow us to conclude  that port efficiency
is  an important  determinant  of maritime transport  costs. For  example,  if countries  like
Ecuador, India or Brazil improved their port efficiency from their current level to the  7 5th
percentile  -that  is,  to  a  level  attained  by France  or  Sweden-  they would  reduce  their
maritime transport costs by more than 15%  each.
A  final caveat  about  these results.  Our model  assumes  that, if inefficiency  in  a
port raises shipping  costs by  10% for a  shipment of shirts, it will increase the shipping
costs for a shipment of cars by the same  10%.  Suppose, instead, that the "tax equivalent"
of port inefficiency  varies  by product.  Then,  products  for which  the  tax  is excessively
high will not be  exported  and we will not observe them in the data.  In other words,  we
have estimated the effect of port inefficiency  for products that are actually shipped.  The
effect  may be higher  for  some  products,  which are  then not exported.  In this  sense  our
estimate of the cost of port inefficiency may be conservative.
48 The low variance on  the containerization  levels  in liner transport  services  may be explaining  this non-
significance.
16IV.  Determinants of Port Efficiency
The  previous  subsection  stresses  the  importance  of port  efficiency  on  maritime
transport  cost, but what are the  factors behind port  efficiency?  The activities  required  at
port  level  are  sometimes  crucial  for  international  trade  transactions.  These  include  not
only activities  that depend on port infrastructure,  like pilotage, towing and tug assistance,
or cargo handling (among  others), but also activities related to customs requirements.  It is
often  claimed  that  "...the  (in)efficiency,  even  timing,  of many  of port  operations  is
strongly influenced (if not dictated) by customs".49' 50
Some  legal  restrictions  can negatively  affect  port performance.  For example,  in
many  countries  workers  are  required  to  have  special  license  to  be  able  to  provide
stevedoring  services,  artificially increasing  seaport  costs.  Other deficiencies,  associated
with port management  itself, are  also harmful  to country competitiveness.  For instance,
some ports still receive cargo without specifying the presentation of a Standard Shipping
Note,  which  is  inconceivable  in  modern  port  practice.  In  many  ports,  it  is  quite
impossible  to  obtain  a written  and  accurate  account  of the main  port  procedures,  and
sometimes  port  regulations  are  not clear  about  the  acceptance  of responsibilities  (for
cargo  in  shed  or  on  the  quay,  for  instance).  All  of this  generates  unreasonably  long
delays,  increases  the risks of damage  and pilferage  of the products  (in  turn  raising the
insurance premiums),  and as a consequence  considerably increases  costs associated  with
port activities.
Port efficiency  varies widely from  country to country and,  specially,  from region
to region.  It is well  know that some  Asian countries  (Singapore,  Hong  Kong)  have the
most efficient ports in the world, while some of the most inefficient are  located in Africa
(Ethiopia,  Nigeria,  Malawi)  or South America (Colombia,  Venezuela,  Ecuador).  Table 3
presents some estimates of port efficiency,  per geographic region.51
49 Thus, any unexpected delay  at ports  due to extra custom requirements or cargo inspections,  for instance,
may  increase  considerably  the  associated  port  costs  (due  to  moving  containers  and  storage  of frozen
products, for example)  and hence reduce exporters competitiveness.
50 See John Raven (2000), for a description of  relevant  issues concerning trade and transport facilitation.
51  We  must  note  that these  efficiency  variables  -per  regions-  are  not  directly  comparable  to  each  other,
because  the  availability  of countries  is  not the  same  for each  of the  variables.  Thus,  we  should think  of
these  as complement rather than substitute measures.
17The  first  column  is  a  subjective  index  based on  surveys  reported  by the  World
Economic  Forum's  1999  Global Competitiveness Report. North  America  and  Europe
have the best rankings,  followed by the Middle  East,  and East Asia &  the Pacific.  Latin
America  and  South Asia,  in turn,  are the regions  perceived  as having  the  least efficient
ports.  The second  column  indicates  the  time,  in  median  days,  to  clear  customs  (taken
from business  surveys  performed  by the Inter-American  Development  Bank and World
Bank52).  The  striking results  are the  ones for Africa  -Southeast Africa and West  Africa-
for which  the  median  number of days  to  clear  customs  is  12.  Among  East  and  South
African countries,  Ethiopia  (30 days),  Kenya,  Tanzania  and  Uganda  (14  days each)  are
the countries  with bigger delays  in clearing  customs; while Cameroon (20 days), Nigeria
(18 days) and Malawi  (17 days) are the West African countries with the biggest delays.53
The  second  region  presenting  big  problems  at  custom  levels  is  Latin  America,  with  a
median  delay  in  clearing  customs  of  7  days.  In  this  group,  Ecuador  (15  days)  and
Venezuela  (11  days) appear as the worst performers.
Finally,  the  third  column  of Table  3 presents  some  estimates  of the  costs  of
handling  containers  inside the ports  (in US$/TEU).  This  variable was  constructed based
on information  provided by the Transport  Division of the  World Bank  and information
from additional papers.54 Despite the fact that the sample of countries  for this variable  is a
lot more restricted  than for the previous  ones, the estimates  are quite consistent with the
previous variables.  While the efficient ports in East Asia present lower charges, the Latin
American  ports  have  the  most  expensive  handling  services.  This  relationship  is  even
clearer when we take  into account wage differential across countries. Table  4 presents the
regression  of handling  costs  -adjusted  by wage  or its  proxy-  on port  efficiency  and  an
index of infrastructure  (same as used in table  1). This index -at country level- is included
under  the  assumption  that  infrastructure  at  country  level  is  highly  correlated  with
infrastructure  at port level.  In Column  (1)  handling  costs are  adjusted by manufacturing
52 The specific question  is: "If you import, how long does it typically take  from the time  your goods  arrive
at their port of entry until the time you can claim them from customs?"
53  The  African countries'  results  from this  survey  are  totally  consistent  with the  results  presented by the
African Competitiveness  Report  2000/2001  (World  Economic  Forum), which performed  the same  custom
clearance question (though the average time presented by the latter are slightly higher).
54 Camara Maritima y Portuaria  de Chile (1999)  and LSU-National  Ports and Waterways Institute (1998).
18wages,55 in Column (2)  and (3) we adjust by per capita GDP (as proxy for wages), and in
Column (4) and (5)  handling costs are adjusted by PPP GDP per capita.
Port  efficiency  is  an  important  determinant  of handling  cost.  Countries  with
inefficient  seaports  have higher handling  costs. Also,  countries  with good  infrastructure
have  lower seaport  costs. Figure  4 presents  the relationship between  handling  costs and
port  efficiency,  controlling  for  PPP  GDP  per  capita  (as  a  proxy  for  wages)  and
infrastructure  level  (Colunm  4 specification  of Table 4).  The  clear negative relationship
shows that  countries  where  ports are  considered  the  most  efficient (e.g.  Singapore  and
Belgium,  not marked in the figure)  are at the  same time the ones whose ports  charge the
least for their services (in comparable units).  In turn, some Latin American countries (e.g.
Brazil, Ecuador,  not marked  in the  figure)  are  among  the worst ranked  in term of their
efficiency and also  present the highest charges per services (after controlling by the level
of infrastructure).56
Finally,  we  try  to  explain  which  are  the factors  behind  port  efficiency.  As  we
already  mentioned  in  the  case  of transport  costs,  it  is  reasonable  to  think  that  the
determinants  of port  efficiency  will not only consist of infrastructure  variables, but  also
of  management  and/or  policy  variables.  Therefore,  besides  a  proxy  for  port
infrastructure,57 we include  among  the  explanatory  variables  two  policy  variables,  one
referring to Cargo Handling  Restrictions and the other to Mandatory Port  Services. Both
variables  are  zero-to-one  indices  from  FMN  (2000).  The  first  captures  restrictions  and
special  requirements  imposed  on  foreign  suppliers  of cargo  handling  services,  where
foreign  suppliers  refer  to  local  companies  with  foreign  participation.58 The  second
captures  the  extent  to  which  port  services  are  mandatory  for  incoming  ships.59 Both
indices represent restrictions at port level that could limit competition,  so we can expect a
55 Manufacturing wages are taken from LNIDO Industrial  Statistics Database.
56  A simnilar result is  obtained when  manufacturing  wages  (from the UNIDO Industrial  Statistics Database)
are  used -instead  of GDP per  capita-  to  adjust  handling  costs.  Appendix  B presents  the  values  used  to
construct these series.
57 We use the index of country infrastructure we constructed as proxy for port infrastructure.
58  The  index  takes a  value  of 0 if no restriction  exists,  0.25  for  minor  restrictions,  0.5  if a joint venture
condition  is imposed, 0.75 if a very high national participation  in the company is required,  and 1 if foreign
companies  are simply forbidden to provide cargo handling services.
59  This  variable  is  constructed  adding  .125  for  each  of the  following  services  if they  are  mandatory:
pilotage,  towing, tug  assistance, navigation  aids, berthing,  waste disposal, anchorage  and others  mandatory
services.
19negative  relationship  between  them  and port  efficiency.  However,  due to  some quality
and security considerations,  we also have to consider that it may be beneficial  to have a
certain level of regulation  at the seaports.  Thus, we also explore  the possibilities of non-
linearities of the effect of each of these indices on port efficiency.
As we  already mentioned,  we  consider the  overall level of infrastructure,  which
we assume to be positively correlated with a country's level of seaport infrastructure.  We
expect the better the infrastructure  the higher the probability of an efficient port; that is, a
positive coefficient  for this variable.  Finally,  we also  include a Crime Index, taken from
the Global  Competitiveness  Report,  and consisting of a one-to  seven index ranking  how
severe is organized crime in a particular  country (with  7 meaning  "not  a problem").  The
idea behind the inclusion of this variable is that organized crime constitutes  a direct threat
to  port  operations  and  merchandise  in transit.  With  all  of this  in  mind,  we  present  in
Table  5 some estimations  of the effects  of these variables  on port efficiency,  calculated
for 1998.
As  it  can  be  seen,  the  coefficient  on  infrastructure  is  always  positive  and
significant.  The  results  for  the  policy  variables  are  somehow  mixed,  but  make  some
sense.  Cargo  handling  restrictions  are not  significant,  no  matter  the  specification.  The
variable  for mandatory port services,  on the other hand,  is significant  both  in level  and
square  level,  presenting  a positive  and negative  sign,  respectively.  This result  suggests
that having some level of regulations  increases  port efficiency,  however,  an excess of it
can  start  to  reverse  these  gains.  In  terms  of the  countries  in  our  sample,  this  result
suggests  that  Argentina  is  taking  advantage  of a moderate  level  of regulation  in  its
seaports, but instead Brazil is reducing its seaport efficiency because of excess regulation.
Using  a  non-parametric  method  (adjusted  spline),  figure  5  presents  this  non-linear
relationship between regulation and port efficiency.
Finally,  the  crime  variable  also  turns  out  to be  highly significant  and  with  the
expected  positive  sign  (remember  that  the  variable  is  defined  as  crime  "not  being  a
problem").  In terms of this  sample,  an increase  in organized  crime from the  25th to  7 5 th
percentiles  implies  a reduction  in port efficiency  from  50th to 25th percentiles.  In  other
words, if countries  like Brazil, China or India (all with indices around the  7 5 th percentile)
reduced their organized crime to levels attained  by countries  like Australia,  New Zealand
20or  the  United  Kingdom  (all  around  the  25th  percentile),  then  they  would  be  able  to
increase  their  port  efficiency  index  roughly  one  point.  This  in  turn  would  generate  a
reduction of maritime transport costs of around 6%.
V.  Conclusion
By  the  1990s many  countries  had  adopted  a development  strategy  emphasizing
integration with the global  economy  and therefore had reduced their tariff and non-tariff
barriers  to  trade.  This reduction  in artificial  trade  barriers  has  raised the importance  of
transport  costs  as  a  remaining  barrier  to  trade.  Therefore,  any  strategy  aimed.  at
integrating a country into the trading system has to take transport costs seriously.
Besides distance and other variables that no government  can change,  an important
determinant  of maritime  transport  costs  is  seaport  efficiency.  An  improvement  in port
efficiency  from  25th to  7 5th percentiles  reduces  shipping costs by more than  12%,  or the
equivalent  of 5,000 miles  in distance.  This  result is robust to different  definition of port
efficiency as well as to different  years.  Inefficient ports also increase handling costs.
Seaport  efficiency,  though,  is  not  just  a  matter  of  physical  infrastructure.
Organized  crime has  an important  negative  effect  on port  services,  increasing  transport
costs.  In  terms  of our  sample,  an  increase  in  organized crime from  the  25th  to  75 th
percentiles implies  a reduction in port efficiency  from 50th  to 25th percentiles.  In addition
our results  suggest  that some  level  of regulation  increases  port efficiency,  but  excessive
regulation can be damaging.
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24Appendix A. Data Description
Transport Costs Estimation (Tables  1 and 2)
Maritime Transport costs:  calculated  as  import  charges  divided  by  weight.  Source:
calculated  from  data  of  the  US  Import  Waterbome  Databank  (US  Department  of
Transportation).
Distance: Correspond  to  the  distance  between  the  foreign  port  i  and  the  US  custom
district J. Data provided by Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000).
Unit Weight: Value  of total  US  imports  divided by its  total weight,  and  calculated  per
maritime route  (where  we define routes as  "from foreign  ports to US  custom districts").
Calculated  from  data  of the  US  Import  Waterbome  Databank  (US  Department  of
Transportation).
Price-Fixing  agreement: Dummy variable  signaling  the  presence  of carrier  agreements
on maritime routes:  conferences  and other price-fixing agreements.  Source:  Fink, Mattoo
and Neagu (2000).
Cooperative agreement: Dummy variable signaling the presence of carrier  agreements on
maritime  routes:  cooperative  working  agreements  that  do  not  have  a  binding  rate
authority.  Source:  Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000).
Containerization: Percentage  of  cargo  transported  by  containers.  Source:  US  Import
Waterborne Databank (US Department of Transportation).
Total Liner Volume:  Total volume  of imports  transported  per maritime route (where  we
define routes  as  "from  foreign  country  to US  coast").  Source:  constructed  from  data of
US  Import Waterborne  Databank (US Department of Transportation).
Foreign GDP per capita: GDP per  capita of the  exporting  countries  to the US.  Source:
World Development Indicators 2000 (The World Bank).
Port Efficiency: one-to-seven  index  ranking port efficiency,  based on surveys performed
to representative firms of each country.  The specific  question is "Port facilities and inland
waterways  are extensive  and efficient (1=strongly  disagree,  7=stronlgy  agree)".  Source:
The Global Competitiveness Report, various years (1996-2000)
Port Efficiency  Variables (Tables 3 and 4)
Container Handling Charges: Correspond  to  containers  handling  charges  inside  the
ports,  expressed  in US$ per TEU (Twenty Feet  Equivalent Unit).  For nineteen countries
we  have  information  from  the  Transport  Division  of  the  World  Bank.  For  twelve
countries,  from which eight  are  in the World Bank  sample,  we have  information  (as an
index)  from  the  Camara  Maritima  y  Portuaria  de  Chile  A.G.  Finally,  for  four  Central
American  countries  from  which  only  Panama  is  in  the  previous  samples,  we  have
25information  from the LSU-  National Ports and Waterways  Institute. Using ratios, we put
all samples in the same unit used by the data from the World Bank.
Port  Efficiency: same as above.
Custom Clearance:  Correspond to time (days, median) to clear customs, based on surveys
performed (by the World Bank) to importers in each country.  The specific  question is "If
you import, how long does it typically take  from the time your  goods arrive  at their port
of entry until the time you can claim them from customs?"  Source: The World Bank.
Manufactures wages: Source: UNIDO Industrial  Statistics Database.
Infrastructure  Index: Correspond to  the  simple average  of three  normalized  indices that
take  into  account  the  country  level  of communications  (telephones)  and  its  physical
transport  infrastructure  (paved roads,  railroads  and airports).  The  exact  definition of the
index is:
INFi = Avg {AIi, TIj, TTIj }  if there are a least two of them
where
PA?  F R?  RI2
AI,=  ,  TI=  =  TTI,  -avg  P  ,  2
,Fj PA,,  X  Tj PJ  P  Si  *  7i  PjS/  J
and T1 is the fixed and mobile telephone lines per capita of country i, PA1 is the number of
paved airports, P1 refers to the population,  Si refers to the surface area,  PRi is paved roads,
and  RR1 is railroads.  The  sources  for the  variables  are:  World Development  Indicators
2000 (The World Bank) and The World Factbook 2000 (Central Intelligence Agency).
Port Efficiency  Estimation (Table 5)
Infrastructure  Index: same as above.
Cargo Handling Restrictions: zero-to-one  index  that  captures  restrictions  and  special
requirements  imposed to  foreign suppliers of cargo  handling  services.  The index takes a
value  of 0  if no  restriction  exists,  0.25  for  minor  restrictions,  0.5  if a joint  venture
condition  is  imposed,  0.75  if a  very  high  national  participation  in  the  company  is
required,  and  1 if foreign  companies  are  simply forbidden  to  provide  cargo  handling
services. Source:  Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000).
Mandatory Port Services:  zero-to-one  index  that  captures  the  extent  to  which  port
services are mandatory for incoming  ships. This variable  is constructed  adding 0.125  for
each  of the  following  services  if they are  mandatory:  pilotage,  towing,  tug  assistance,
navigation  aids,  berthing,  waste  disposal,  anchorage  and  others  mandatory  services.
Source: Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000).
Organized Crime: one-to-seven index ranking  "organized  crime  as not been a problem",
based  on  surveys  performed  to  representative  firms  of  each  country.  The  specific
26question  is "Organized  crime does not impose  significant costs  on business  and is not a
burden  (1=strongly  disagree,  7=stronlgy  agree)".  Source:  The  Global  Competitiveness
Report, various years (1996-2000)
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Cargo Hand.  Mandatory  Prce  Fixed  Cooperative  Median  Port  Crime  Container Handling  Charges
Country  Restriction  Services  Agreements  Agreements  Clearance time  Efficiency  Wort  Bank  CMPCH  LSU
Index  Index  Index  Index  Days  Index (1-7)  Index (1-7)  US$ITEU  Index  Index
Argentina  0.00  0.13  0.00  1.00  7.0  3.81  4.52  na  139  na
Armenia  na  na  na  na  4.0  na  Na  na  na  na
Australia  0.00  0.13  1.00  1.00  na  4.79  6.19  199  na  na
Azerbija  na  na  na  na  5.0  na  na  na  na  na
Belarus  na  na  na  na  4.0  na  na  na  na  na
Belgium  0.00  0.06  1.00  0.00  na  6.17  5.73  120  na  na
Belize  na  na  na  na  5.0  na  na  na  na  na
Benin  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  na  na  na  na  na  na
Bolivia  na  na  na  na  9.5  1.61  4.38  na  na  na
Botswana  na  na  na  na  4.0  na  na  na  na  na
Brazil  0.50  0.75  0.00  1.00  10.0  2.92  4.45  328  292  na
Brunei  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  na  na  na  na  na  na
Bulgaria  na  na  na  na  2.0  3.68  3.23  na  na  na
Cambodia  na  na  na  na  7.0  na  na  na  na  na
Cameroon  na  na  na  na  20.0  na  na  na  na  na
Canada  0.00  0.13  0.00  0.00  2.0  6.42  6.27  190  na  na
CDI  na  na  na  na  8.5  na  na  na  na  na
Chile  0.00  0.25  0.43  1.00  3.0  3.76  6.05  202  100  na
China  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  7.0  3.49  4.44  110  na  na
Colombia  0.50  0.13  0.50  1.00  7.0  2.26  1.88  na  na  na
Costa Rica  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  4.0  2.46  3.28  na  na  68
Croatia  na  na  na  na  2.0  na  na  na  na  na
Cyprus  1.00  0.31  0.00  0.00  na  na  na  na  na  na
CzechRep  na  na  na  na  2.0  3.27  4.41  na  na  na
Trinidad and T.  na  na  na  na  7.0  na  na  na  na  na
Denmark  0.00  0.06  1.00  0.00  na  6.16  6.71  na  na  na
Dominican  R.  0.25  0.25  0.50  1.00  7.0  na  na  na  na  na
Ecuador  0.00  0.00  0.43  1.00  15.0  2.63  3.65  na  139  na
Egypt  0.75  0.75  0.00  0.00  5.5  3.72  6.37  na  na  na
El Salvador  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  4.0  2.95  2.30  na  na  61
Estonia  na  na  na  na  1.0  na  na  na  na  na
Ethiopia  na  na  na  na  30.0  na  na  na  na  na
Finland  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.00  na  6.26  6.63  na  na  na
France  0.00  0.38  1.00  0.00  3.0  5.39  6.58  201  na  na
Georgia  na  na  na  na  2.0  na  na  na  na  na
Germany  0.00  0.38  1.00  0.00  5.0  6.38  6.02  163  117  na
Ghana  1.00  0.50  0.00  1.00  5.0  na  na  na  na  na
Greece  1.00  0.19  0.00  0.00  na  4.28  5.60  na  na  na
Guatemala  na  na  na  na  7.0  na  na  na  na  55
Haiti  na  na  na  na  15.0  na  na  na  na  na
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Cargo  Hand.  Mandatory  Price  Fixed  Cooperative  Median  Port  Crime  Container Handling Charges
Country  Restriction  Services  Agreements  Agreements  Clearance time  Efficiency  Index (1-7)  World Bank  CMPCH  LSU
Index  Index  Index  Index  Days  Index (1-7)  US$1TEU  Index  Index
Honduras  na  na  na  na  4.0  na  na  na  na  na
Hong Kong  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.00  na  6.38  5.46  na  na  na
Hungary  na  na  na  na  3.0  2.59  4.14  na  na  na
Iceland  0.00  0.13  0.00  0.00  na  5.78  6.64  na  na  na
India  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  na  2.79  4.28  na  na  na
Indonesia  1.00  0.06  0.00  0.38  5.0  3.41  4.06  na  na  na
Ireland  0.00  0.13  1.00  0.00  na  4.28  5.12  na  na  na
Italy  0.25  0.50  0.38  0.00  2.0  4.11  3.29  228  na  na
Ivory Coast  0.00  0.25  0.00  1.00  na  na  na  na  na  na
Jamaica  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.60  na  na  na  na  na  na
Japan  0.75  0.13  0.89  1.00  na  5.16  5.16  250  202  na
Kazakhst  na  na  na  na  9.0  na  na  na  na  na
Kenya  na  na  na  na  14.0  na  na  na  na  na
Korea  0.00  0.38  0.00  0.00  na  4.12  5.22  na  na  na
Kyrghizs  na  na  na  na  10.0  na  na  na  na  na
Lithuani  na  na  na  na  1.0  na  na  na  na  na
Madagascar  na  na  na  na  10.0  na  na  na  na  na
Malawi  na  na  na  na  17.0  na  na  na  na  na
Malaysia  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.38  7.0  4.95  5.76  75  na  na
Mauritius  1.00  0.38  0.00  0.00  na  5.35  5.53  na  na  na
Mexico  0.50  0.38  0.00  1.00  4.0  3.34  2.61  na  na  na
Moldova  na  na  na  na  5.0  na  na  na  na  na
Morocco  0.50  0.13  0.00  0.00  na  na  na  na  na  na
Namibia  na  na  na  na  4.0  na  na  na  na  na
Netherlands  0.00  0.50  1.00  0.00  na  6.64  5.42  156  84  na
New Zealand  0.00  0.38  1.00  1.00  na  5.82  6.14  na  na  na
Nicaragua  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  5.0  na  na  na  na  na
Nigeria  0.00  0.50  0.00  1.00  18.0  na  na  na  na  na
Panama  na  na  na  na  5.0  na  na  na  234  100
Papa N.Guinea  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  na  na  na  na  na  na
Peru  0.50  0.00  0.50  1.00  7.0  2.88  3.32  na  142  na
Philippines  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.38  7.0  2.79  3.51  118  na  na
Poland  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.0  3.34  3.41  na  na  na
Portugal  0.00  0.13  1.00  0.00  8.0  3.81  6.50  na5  na  na
Romania  0.00  0.63  0.00  0.00  3.0  na  na  na  na  na
Russia  na  na  na  na  7.0  3.33  2.23  na  na  na
Senegal  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  7.0  na  na  na  na  na
Singapore  1.00  0.38  0.00  0.33  2.0  6.76  6.72  117  na  na
Slovakia  na  na  na  na  2.0  3.50  4.35  na  na  na
Slovenia  na  na  na  na  2.0  na  na  na  na  na
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Cargo Hand.  Mandatory  Price Fixed  Cooperatve  Median  Port  Crime  Container Handling Charges
Country  Restction  Servia  Ageements  Agreements  Cearence  time  Efficency  Index (1-7)  Worl Bank  CMPCH  LSU
Index  Index  Index  Index  Days  Index (1  -7)  US$STEU  Index  Index
South Africa  na  na  na  na  5.0  5.24  2.08  na  na  na
Spain  0.00  0.06  1.00  0.00  4.0  4.88  6.08  200  105  na
Sweden  0.00  0.06  1.00  0.00  2.0  5.73  6.46  na  na  na
Taiwan  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  na  5.18  4.49  140  163  na
Tanzania  na  na  na  na  14.0  na  na  na  na  na
Thailand  0.50  0.63  0.00  0.38  4.0  3.98  5.12  93  na  na
Togo  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  na  na  na  na  na  na
Tunisia  0.50  0.13  0.00  0.00  5.5  na  na  na  na  na
Turkey  0.00  0.00  OA3  0.00  na  3.81  5.00  na  na  na
Upnda  na  na  na  na  14.0  na  na  na  na  na
Ukraine  na  na  na  na  10.0  3.41  3.28  na  na  na
United Kingdom  0.00  0.31  1.00  0.00  4.0  5.37  6.17  173  na  na
United States  na  na  na  na  5.0  6.27  5.40  259  336  na
Uruguay  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  5.0  na  na  na  na  na
Uzbekist  na  na  na  na  7.0  na  na  na  na  na
Venezuela  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00  11.0  3.28  3.63  na  na  na
Vietnam  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.50  na  3.81  5.02  na  na  na
Zamnbia  na  na  na  na  10.0  na  na  na  na  na
Zimnbabwe  na  na  na  na  10.0  3.29  5.15  na  na  na
na: not available
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Imports Freight Costs (CIF/FOB ratio) and Import Tariffs
relative to Import value, 1996-97
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31Figure 3
Export Freight Costs and US Tariff,
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33Table 1: Determinants of Maritime Transport Costs, 1998
Dependent Variable:  TC=(Charges / Weight)
OLS estimations  IV estimations
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Distance  0.18  0.19  0.18  0.18  0.17  0.17
(11.37)***  (9.83)***  (11.41)***  (10.21)***  (8.47)***  (10.37)***
Weight value  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55
(54.77)***  (51.66)***  (48.78)***  (54.75)***  (50.96)***  (48.81)***
Policy variables
Price fixing rate agreement  0.06  0.02  -0.00  0.06  0.02  0.01
(=1 if agreement exist)  (1.88)*  (0.64)  (0.14)  (1.71)*  (0.51)  (0.28)
Cooperative agreement  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02
(=1 if agreement exist)  (0.89)  (1.30)  (0.78)  (0.90)  (1.23)  (0.83)
Containerization  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03
(2.78)***  (2.30)**  (2.22)**  (2.87)***  (2.27)**  (2.28)**
Total liner volume  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  --  --  --
(foreign country to US coast)  (3.70)***  (2.85)***  (4.47)***  --  --  --
Total liner volume (Instr)  . _  -0.02  -0.04  -0.04
(foreign GDP)  - - _  (2.19)**  (2.72)***  (3.85)***
Foreign port efficiency
Foreign GDP per capita  -0.05  -0.05
(proxy for infrastructure)  (5.78)***  --  (5.16)***  --
Port efficiency  - -0.05  -0.05
(Global Conipet. Report)  - (3.87)***  --  --  (3.53)***  -
Infrastructure  Index  --  --  -0.03  --  --  -0.03
(proxy for port infast.)  --  --  (3.36)***  --  - (3.50)***
Observations  332,593  314,462  289,834  332,593  314,462  289,834
R-squared (adj.)  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47
Notes:  Robust t-statistics  in parentheses;  * significant at 10%;  ** significant  at 5%;  ***  significant  at  1%.
All  estimations  include  fixed  effects  for  products  (4848  products)  and  for  US  districts  (31  districts).
Regressions allow the observations  to be independent  across exporting countries,  and interdependent  within
each country.
34Table 2: Determinants of Maritime Transport Costs,  1995-1999
Dependent Variable: TC=(Charges / Weight)
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Distance  0.17  0.16  0.17  0.17  0.25
(6.30)***  (5.61)***  (6.34)***  (8.47)***  (9.86)***
Weight value  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.53
(49.87)***  (42.34)***  (56.63)***  (50.96)***  (54.48)***
Policy variables
Price fixing rate agreement  0.02  0.06  0.08  0.02  -0.07
(=1  if agreement exist)  (0.51)  (1.13)  (1.72)*  (0.51)  (1.98)**
Cooperative  agreement  -0.05  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  0.01
(=1 if agreement exist)  (1.67)*  (1.56)  (0.99)  (1.23)  (0.35)
Containerization  -0.03  0.02  -0.002  -0.03  0.003
(1.32)  (0.91)  (0.15)  (2.27)**  (0.12)
Total liner volume (Instr)  -0.03  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  0.0001
(foreign GDP)  (1.75)*  (2.05)**  (2.58)**  (2.72)***  (0.01)
Foreign port efficiency
Port efficiency  -0.080  -0.072  -0.068  -0.053  -0.057
(Global Compet. Report)  (4.07)***  (4.07)***  (4.03)***  (3.53)***  (4.41)***
Observations  273,337  273,063  297,825  314,462  346,868
R-squared  0.52  0.49  0.49  0.47  0.45
Notes:  Robust t-statistics in parentheses;  * significant at  10%; ** significant  at 5%;  ***  significant  at
1%.  All  estimations  include  fixed  effects  for  products  (4848  products)  and  for  US  districts  (31).
Regressions  allow the  observations  to be  independent  across  exporting  countries,  and interdependent
within each country.
35Table 3: Port Efficiency Variables
Port  Custom  Container Handling
Efficiency  Clearance  Charges in Ports
(7=best,  1=worst)  (days)  (US$/TEU)
North  America  6.35  3.50  261.7
Europe (excl.  East)  5.29  4.00  166.7
Middle East  4.93  na  na
East Asia & the Pacific  4.66  5.57  150.5
East & South Africa  4.63  12.00  na
North Africa  3.72  5.50  na
Former Soviet Union  3.37  5.42  na
East Europe  3.28  2.38  na
Latin Am. & the Caribbean  2.90  7.08  251.4
South Asia  2.79  --  na
West Africa  na  11.70  na
Sources:  Global  Competitiveness  Report  (1999),  World  Bank  Surveys,  Camara  Maritirna  y
Portuaria de Chile. A.G. (1999),  and LSU (1998). (na: not available)
Table 4: Handling Costs  and Port Efficiency,  1998
Dependent  variable:  Container Handling Charges, divided by wage or proxy (in logarithm)
(1)  (2)  (3)  a  (4)  (5)  a
Variables  (adj. by  (adj. by  (adj. by  (adj. by  (adj. by
m. wage)  GDPpc)  GDPpc)  GDPpc PPP)  GDPpc PPP)
Port Efficiency  -0.48  -0.37  -0.31  -0.33  -0.31
(Global Compet. Report)  (14.69)***  (7.69)***  (3.95)***  (6.02)***  (5.09)***
Infrastructure Index b  -0.14  -0.36  -0.42  -0.14  -0.14
(proxy for port  (2.04)*  (9.09)***  (12.89)***  (3.81)***  (4.24)***
infrastructure)
Constant  -2.28  -2.82  -3.20  -3.00  -3.11
(10.42)***  (10.00)***  (6.93)***  (9.38)***  (8.69)***
Observations  12  23  18  23  18
R-squared  0.95  0.93  0.95  0.88  0.88
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  * significant  at  10%; ** significant at 5%;  ***  significant
at  1%. a: regression uses  handling cost data from the World Bank only.  b: the infrastructure  index is
in logarithm.
36Table 5: Determinants of Port Efficiency,  1998
Dependent var.: Port Efficiency  (from the Global Competitiveness  Report)
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)
Infrastructure  0.27  0.26  0.26
(3.04)***  (2.81)***  (2.86)***
Cargo Handling Restrictions  0.84  0.05  --
(0.72)  (0.16)  --
Cargo Handling Restrictions  (sqr.)  -0.85  --  --
(0.70)  --  --
Mandatory Port Services  3.43  3.37  3.41
(2.25)**  (2.19)**  (2.30)**
Mandatory Port Services (sqr.)  -5.20  -4.90  -4.91
(2.42)**  (2.31)**  (2.34)**
Organized Crime  0.54  0.51  0.51
(Org. crime is not a problem)  (4.66)***  (5.72)***  (5.84)***
Constant  1.96  2.10  2.11
(2.65)**  (3.37)***  (3.45)***
Nr. Observations  41  41  41
R sq.  0.77  0.77  0.77
Notes: Robust t-statistics  in parentheses.  * significant  at 10%;  ** significant  at 5%; *
significant at  1%.
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